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Introduction
The Greece debt crisis has been difficult
for the Greek people, the Eurozone, and the
world at large. To avoid default, Greece must
raise billions of euros in revenue every year to
pay down its debt. The country has developed
a number of strategies for achieving this goal,
one of which is adopting a new property tax,
which is expected to raise €2 billion in tax rev-
enue yearly. While the tax was established to
meet a dire need for revenue, it is also an eco-
nomic policy that would be supported by econ-
omist Henry George, an ardent advocate of land
taxation who would likely endorse the Greek
property tax, were he alive today. Unfortunately,
the property tax has been met with considerable
public resistance, and its future is uncertain. In
this paper I argue that, though unpopular
with the Greek people, the property tax should
be upheld as an important source of revenue for
a country that needs it badly.
The Greek Debt Crisis
The Greek fiscal crisis represents a signif-
icant threat to the global economy. The problem
escalated to crisis level in 2009 when the nation’s
credit rating was downgraded to triple B, the
lowest in the Eurozone. Prime Minister George
Papandreou responded by implementing a plan
that included taxing the income bonuses of
the richest people in the private sector at 90 per-
cent and banning bonuses altogether in the pub-
lic sector. The plan failed to build confidence
in the Greek debt market, and on January 11,
2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
sent a technical team to Athens to help with 
pension reform, tax policy and collections, and
budgetary controls. On January 14, Greece
announced a three-year plan to bring the budget
deficit down from 12.7 percent to 2.8 percent
of GDP (Cadman, Minto, and Bernard).
In April 2010, the Eurozone committed to
providing Greece with up to €30 billion in three-
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year loans, with the IMF providing another
€15 billion. The loans carried an interest rate of
about five percent, which was above the IMF
standard lending rate, but below the rate private
investors were charging Greece. Amid fears that
the plan might not be executed, Standard &
Poor’s downgraded Greece’s debt to junk status.
At this point, the crisis had started affecting
other Eurozone countries as well; Portugal’s
debt, for example, was downgraded from AAA to
A (Cadman et al.).
On May 2, 2010, the Eurozone approved
a new €110 billion set of loans, with €80 bil-
lion coming directly from Eurozone coun-
tries. In return for this aid, Greece agreed to €24
billion in cost-cutting measures, including a
three-year wage freeze for public sector work-
ers. The goal was to reduce Greece’s deficit of
13.6 percent of GDP down to 4 percent of GDP
by 2014 (Cendrowicz). Then, on May 10, the EU
and IMF extended a €750 billion loan package
to Greece in addition to the €110 billion com-
mitted just days earlier (Cadman et al.).
On August 5, 2010, researchers from the
European Commission, IMF, and European Cen-
tral Bank told the press that Greece was deliv-
ering fiscal and structural reforms on time,
but needed to work harder at combating tax eva-
sion. Furthermore, the organizations made clear
that Greece needed to show sufficient progress
to qualify for the second €9 billion tranche from
their €110 billion loan package (Cadman et
al.). On October 4, 2010, Greece unveiled a 2011
budget plan for its deficit to drop to 7.0 per-
cent of GDP, exceeding the 7.6 percent deficit
goal they agreed to with the European Commis-
sion, IMF, and ECB (Cadman et al.).
On February 21, 2011, Greece unveiled
legislation to fight tax evasion. This legisla-
tion was among the reforms required by the EU
and IMF as part of the bailout agreement. The
new measure includes ‘name and shame’ cam-
paigns for evaders, jail sentences for extreme tax
evaders, and the appointment of an independ-
ent body of tax arbitrators to accelerate reso-
lution of tax disputes of over €150,000 (Cadman
et al.). On July 3, 2011, Greece received an
€8.7 billion loan from the Eurozone as part of
the €110 billion package. If it had not received
the loan, the Greek government would have
been insolvent within weeks. To qualify for
this disbursement of aid, Greece had to pass a
€28 billion austerity package in June (Cadman
et al.).
European leaders agreed to a new €109
billion bailout package for Greece on July 21,
2011. However, for this bailout, the Eurozone
required that Greek bondholders accept a
restructuring of the terms of their bonds. Bond-
holders had multiple options for the details of
restructuring, but stipulations generally
involved either a 20 percent haircut or a matu-
rity extension. Then, on October 27, 2011, a
new agreement stipulated that all Greek bond-
holders were required to accept a 50 percent
haircut (Cadman et al.).
Ultimately, the only way for Greece to
climb out of its crisis is by reducing debt with
tax revenues. The problem is that Greek tax 
collection levels are significantly lower than
they could be. The Bank of Greece estimates that
the Greek government could be losing as much
as €5 billion each year to illegal tax dodging 
(Chokshi). For all the different taxes in the
Greek tax system, the ability of the government
to generate revenue is substantially impaired by
a culture of tax evasion.
The Greek Tax System
According to Bloomberg, Greece’s 2010
annual tax revenue was €51.1 billion, leaving the
country with a budget deficit of about €24.1 bil-
lion, or 10 percent of GDP. These revenues were
collected from a number of different sources.
Among these are the income tax, the value-
added tax (VAT), the capital gains tax, the cor-
porate tax, and the newly created property tax.
The income tax is progressive, with mar-
ginal rates starting at 18 percent of income
for those earning €12,000 to €16,000 yearly,
increasing to 45 percent for those with annual
earnings over €100,000, and up to 90 percent
on bonuses for the very wealthy. The VAT is paid
at each exchange in the process of manufac-
turing and selling products. On March 15, 2010,
the VAT rate was increased from 19 to 21 per-
cent, and on July 1, 2010 it was increased 
further to 23 percent. Corporate income taxes
were set to 24 percent in 2010 and scheduled 
to decrease by one percentage point per 
year until they reach 20 percent in January 
2014 (“Greece Income . . .”). Figure 1 shows
Greek tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
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compared to EU tax revenue as a percentage
of GDP (Linden and Sabina).
The Greek tax system fails to collect
enough revenue because many Greek citizens
refuse to pay their taxes (Surowiecki). This phe-
nomenon, in which citizens change their
behavior to escape paying taxes illegally, is
known as tax evasion; tax avoidance, in con-
trast, occurs when citizens escape paying
taxes by legal means. The New Yorker describes
illegal tax evasion as Greece’s national pas-
time (Surowiecki). In the last few years Greeks
have failed collectively to pay 25% of what they
owe in taxes. This tax evasion is engrained in
the Greek culture. Greece’s shadow economy,
or the section of the economy that is legal
but not recorded on official books, is estimated
to be 27.5 percent of Greek GDP. This system
puts excessive burden on those who do pay
taxes (Surowiecki).
The most common culprits are those in
the service industry, including doctors, lawyers,
plumbers, mechanics, and electricians, among
others. The provision of these services can be
readily hidden from the government if not
reported in tax filings. The normal proof of serv-
ice is a receipt issued by the server. In Greece,
however, service providers routinely avoid issu-
ing receipts and are known to offer discounted
fees to those customers who do not request
receipts. For example, a doctor might charge
$500 for a particular procedure but offer the
same operation for $475 or $450 for patients
willing to forego receipts. Patients most often
seize this opportunity and thereby eliminate any
paper trail of fees paid for services. These fees
are not included when doctors report yearly
income in their tax filings (Dabilis).
There is also a second common way in
which taxes are evaded. Corruption is wide-
spread in Greece, especially among tax officials.
It is said that the most common way for a $9,000
tax bill to be settled is for $3,000 to go to the
government as a negotiated payment for the tax,
$3,000 to stay in the pockets of the debtor,
and $3,000 to go to the tax collector himself.
In other words, tax collectors are known to
accept bribes and offer favorable tax settlements
in return. Many tax collectors simply fail even
to do their jobs. For instance, in June 2011 some
Figure 1
Total Revenue Collected, as a Share of GDP
Source: Linden and Sabina.
tax collection offices did not do a single audit,
and the average rate was fewer than one audit
per office employee. Furthermore, when tax
reforms were instituted in September 2011,
tax collectors went on strike in protest (Greek
Tax . . .).
Greece has adopted a number of policies
to combat tax evasion and increase tax revenues
in addressing its fiscal crisis. Perhaps the most
original and controversial of these is the new
property tax. The tax, which has already raised
considerable revenue, was designed to fight
tax evasion and ensure that homeowners’ taxes
are calculated objectively.
The Property Tax
The Greek Parliament passed the property
tax on September 27, 2011 with 155 votes in
favor, 142 opposed, and 3 abstaining (Bouras).
This tight vote foreshadowed a wave of opposi-
tion that the public has since mounted against
the tax.
When the property tax was passed, many
believed it could reduce the Greek budget deficit
by €2 billion per year (Smith, Sept. 2011). The
Greek Finance Ministry has estimated that
Greeks have more than €400 billion invested
in real property (“Greek Lawmakers . . .”). Before
the vote in parliament, Finance Minister Evan-
gelos Venizelos said, “With this measure, we will
be able to achieve the fiscal target for 2011
and 2012” (Bouras). According to Greece’s Mem-
orandum of Economic and Financial Policies to
the IMF, this promise meant reducing the
budget deficit to €17 billion, or 7.5 percent of
GDP for 2011. The tax affects approximately 5.1
million Greek properties (Kat), and some have
argued that the size of the tax in relation to
property values is quite reasonable.
On average, the property tax is €4 per
square meter (Kyriakidou). However, this is just
an average; the amount taxed per square meter
varies with the property being taxed. The level
of taxation is based on three factors:
• The size of the property, defined as
the area (in square meters) that is sup-
plied with electricity. This figure is
often equal to the housing area, but
can include garages and balconies.
• The age of the property. Properties less
than 25 years old are taxed at a higher
rate, as shown in Figure 2. Each prop-
erty is assigned a specific “age multi-
plier.” (For instance, a 30-year-old
house will have an age multiplier of
1, but a 13-year-old house will have
an age multiplier of 1.15.)
• The location, or zone, of the property. 
Source: Kat.
The zoning rates, shown in Figure 3, are
expected to rise over time to increase annual tax
revenues (Kat). Each geographic zone is
assigned an identifying number and is associ-
ated with a certain “zone rate.” For instance, the
vast majority of villages in Greece fall into the
0-500 range with a zone rate of €3 per square
meter. Other areas in Greece, assigned zone
numbers between 501 and 1000, are taxed at €4
per square meter. Zones are grouped as geo-
graphic regions, so all citizens in geographic
region A would have the same zone identify-
ing number. However, the quality of life of
each region plays a large role in determining the
zone identifying number. In general, the zone
identifying number correlates approximately
with property values of a given area, but the
zone identifying number is not a direct meas-
ure of, nor does it exactly correlate to, the value
of each individual property.1 The tax a Greek
property-owner pays annually is calculated as:
(square meters) x (age multiplier) x (zone
rate) (Kat).
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1Note that under special circumstances, individuals
can receive a reduced zone rate of €0.50 per square meter.
These individuals are said to be in a vulnerable group. To be
in a vulnerable group, one must either be unemployed, have
over 3 children under 18 years old, or be more than 80
percent disabled.
Figure 2
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The value of a property is not one of the
factors that determines the property tax. How-
ever, it can be argued that the entire reason
the tax is calculated in this manner is to provide
an estimate for property values, which are inher-
ently difficult to determine. Experienced
appraisers can disagree on the value of a par-
ticular property. In fact, they do so quite fre-
quently. The formula that Greece uses to calcu-
late property taxes estimates actual property
value more objectively than appraisers do.
The three factors used to determine the tax
on a property can be considered the three fac-
tors that determine the value of the property
as well. Larger properties, of course, are higher
in value, so property value is directly propor-
tional to size. Newer properties are also, on aver-
age, worth more. The property tax reflects this
criterion by giving newer properties a larger age
multiplier and therefore a higher tax. Lastly, cer-
tain geographic regions tend to have higher
property values than others, even when square
footage and age are constant. The property tax
reflects the value of the higher zone identifying
numbers. The tax is therefore based in part on
property value.
As an example of the property tax calcula-
tion, consider a hypothetical residential house
in Athens. The house is in a part of Athens
where the zone identifying number is 1200.
As shown in Figure 3, the zone rate is €5 per
square meter. The house is 16 years old. Accord-
ing to Figure 2, the age multiplier is 1.1. The
house measures 245 square meters of space
supplied with electricity. The annual property
tax is (245) x (1.1) x (5) = €1,347.5. If the owner
of the property has 4 children under 18, then
the household would be categorized as vul-
nerable.2 The annual property tax would then
be (245) x (1.1) x (0.5) = €134.75.
Some Greek property is exempt from tax-
ation. Exempt properties include: churches,
monasteries, and other places of worship; state-
owned properties; embassies/consulates; non-
profit and property of charitable organizations
if used for a social-needs purpose; factories; facil-
ities legally recognized as sporting facilities;
cemeteries; historical or archaeological mon-
uments; and empty non-residential properties
(Kat). Furthermore, the tax applies only to
homeowners who occupy their properties.
Tenants and lease-holders are exempt, as are
landlords if they do not occupy the properties
in question. This structure appears to allow
for tax avoidance. One strategy for avoidance
would be for two homeowners simply to
exchange residences and occupy each others’
houses. However, this practice has not sur-
faced as a problem to date.
The most distinct characteristic of the
Greek property tax is the method of collec-
tion. Property owners are billed for the prop-
erty tax by electric and power companies, and
the tax is paid along with the electric bill (Kat).
Figure 3
Source: Kat.
2However, those with a zone identifying number
greater than 3,000 cannot be in a vulnerable group, even
if they meet one of the criteria.
Electric and power companies are also respon-
sible for assessing the tax. The government
establishes and provides zone rates for this cal-
culation. With each current installation of
the tax, electric companies work with local
municipalities and taxpayers themselves to
update databases with accurate information on
the ages of the properties and the total areas
that are supplied with electricity (Gregory, 
p. 3). Owners of exempt properties must apply
to the Greek tax office for a refund. The tax
office will cross-check the application with
other tax statements to verify accuracy before
awarding the refund (Kat). This policy allows
little room for false claims of exempt status.
In cases where property owners try to avoid the
tax by disconnecting their electricity or acquir-
ing it from a source other than a Greek power
company, they are billed directly by the govern-
ment tax office (Kat).
This tax collection method is designed to
combat tax evasion. If Greek property owners
fail to pay their taxes, power companies respond
as if the power bills are not paid and discontinue
the supply of electricity (Daley, 2011). This
revolutionary tax enforcement policy is the first
of its kind in Greece. Property owners have
eighty days to pay their power and property
tax bills before power is cut. Some property
owners are exempt from the discontinuation
of the power supply. Exemptions are granted by
committees consisting of tax office employees
and social workers if property owners: (1)
show evidence of treatment for a specific health
problem that requires electricity; or (2) prove
they have no assets other than the properties
subject to the tax; or (3) have proof of some
other legitimate hardship worthy of exemp-
tion (Kat).
In fiscal year 2011, Greeks were invoiced
by electric companies in two installments.
The first was in October 2011, and the second
was in January 2012. Fiscal year 2012 invoices
have four installments. The Public Power Cor-
poration of Greece (PPC), Greece’s biggest elec-
tric power company, has committed to issuing
190,000 statements a day, enough to complete
the invoices for each installment within a
month and a half. The process has been
designed to handle logistical contingencies, but
the effect on the Greek debt crisis remains to 
be seen.
A Note on Henry George and the
Single Tax
Greece’s new property tax is, to some
degree, in harmony with the philosophy of the
political economist Henry George (1839 to
1897), who was concerned with the rising
inequality that he believed was caused largely
by the private ownership of land. In his popu-
lar book Progress and Poverty, George observes
that landowners did not create the land, but
through ownership could charge rent for its use.
With an increasing population, the wealth of
land owners would increase relative to the
wealth of renters (Lawrence). Henry George
believed that the best solution for this prob-
lem was not for the government to seize all land
for public use, but rather to leave the land in
private hands and tax it fairly.
One of the problems George saw in the
untaxed private ownership of land is that the
value of land is largely determined not by the
actions of the property owner, but by the com-
munity in which the property is located. Some
of the leading drivers of property values are
the quality of the local police force, fire depart-
ment, and education system. These are large
public expenditures, and it is therefore unjust,
according to George, for private individuals to
benefit from them. Not only is it unjust, but it
mismatches economic incentives. For instance,
landowners with large holdings taxed at low
rates are motivated to increase government
spending where it is likely to increase their own
property values. Alternatively, a Henry George
tax makes the citizens’ tax payments increase as
their property values increase, which forces
them to “pay to increase their property val-
ues” (Moore). Practically speaking, this system
would have obstacles to overcome in the con-
tinual assessment of property values, but it
would nonetheless be economically appropriate,
as the people who benefit from tax revenues
would also pay their cost. The resulting sys-
tem would allocate resources where they add the
most value.
George observed that the world’s most
common taxes are on production. Today we
see that in the income tax, the corporate tax,
and the VAT (value-added tax). George realized
that a tax on production discourages economic
growth. A land tax, however, does not have
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this effect. Land is a factor of production with
inelastic supply. Thus, a tax on land cannot
reduce the amount of land in existence, nor
reduce its productivity. The last, and perhaps
most relevant, criticism Henry George had of
conventional forms of taxation is that they allow
for many methods of fraudulent tax evasion.
Conventional tax systems, such as the income
tax, allow people to evade taxes by failing to
file their tax reports, by under-reporting their
income, or by over-reporting or falsely claiming
deductions. Corporations can illegally evade
taxes in similar ways. These tax systems there-
fore require large and costly bureaucracies to
enforce and collect the taxes. The cost of collec-
tion can be a significant percentage of the
total revenue collected (especially after factor-
ing in the cost to the economy of talent that is
being deprived from other sectors and roles).
A property tax, however, is simple to collect and
enforce, as the existence of a property would
be very hard to overlook, and its fair appraisal
value can be relatively easily determined
(Moore).
Henry George and the Greek 
Property Tax
To summarize, Henry George believed in
land taxation for three reasons, as follows:
1) The value of the land comes from the
quality of the surrounding community,
so it is economically sound for
increases in value to help support the
surrounding community.
2) Land taxation does not tax production,
so it does not discourage production.
In fact, it encourages production and
discourages speculation, as land
investors must overcome a greater
hurdle to see positive returns.
3) A land tax is relatively easy to adminis-
ter, and relatively hard for citizens to
illegally evade.
The Greek property tax is essentially a tax on
structural square footage, and not a tax on
land itself. Some of Henry George’s benefits of
land taxation apply to the Greek property tax,
while others apply only to strict land taxation.
George’s first point clearly applies to the
Greek property tax. The value of Greek property
is largely derived from the quality of the 
surrounding community, so it is economically
beneficial for Greek property owners to return
this value to the surrounding community
through taxation. Also, the size of the tax varies
directly with the value of the surrounding com-
munity because the tax is calculated using zone
rates instead of the appraised value of each indi-
vidual property. The only way in which the
Greek tax is not consistent with George’s first
point is that it is applied not locally but at the
federal level. However, while some of the tax
benefits other parts of Greece, and some goes
toward paying down the national debt, some
of it is returned to the community in which
the taxpayer’s property is located.
George’s second point may not be fully
applicable to Greece’s property tax because the
Greek property tax can be understood as a tax
on production. It is a tax on the square footage
of housing structures that are supplied with
electricity. This square footage is produced:
architects, electricians, contractors, and others
develop property to the point that it becomes
subject to the tax. Taxing developed property
in this way can be expected to lower the value
of developed property, as homeowners must pay
a tax in addition to their mortgage. This reduc-
tion in property value reduces the incentive
for development. Though the Greek property tax
offers several distinct economic benefits, it does
tax production and thereby discourage to it
some degree. 
George’s third and last point applies clearly
to the Greek property tax. The Greek tax is
administered through electricity providers.
When citizens illegally try to evade the tax, their
electricity is shut off. It is hard to imagine a
tax system that is more effectively administered,
or more difficult to evade.
Reaction to the Property Tax
While projections indicate that the new
property tax could generate €2 billion per year
for the Greek government, it is also expected
to have an adverse effect on the Greek economy.
Before the property tax was passed, the Greek
GDP was expected to shrink by 3.9 percent in
2011. After it was passed, GDP was expected to
shrink by more than 5 percent (Kyriakidou).
The tax also has also incited anger and
rebellion among Greek citizens. The Federation
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of Greek commerce is quoted as saying, “The
measures, like a self-fulfilling Cassandra
prophecy, will not be the last,” and “Really, how
many times must we buy our shops and
homes?” (Kyriakidou). Greek journalist Helena
Smith also reported, “Few measures have
elicited more anger—or ingenious forms of
revolt—than the property tax announced by
Greek ministers” (Smith, Dec. 2011). In the
three months following the initiation of the
property tax, many stakeholders, from local
mayors to electric corporations, vowed to
oppose it (Smith, Dec. 2011). The magnitude of
the uproar was unexpected, even in Greece,
where 30 percent of the economy is under-
ground (Smith, Dec. 2011). Militant unionists
picketed against the tax in front of power cor-
porations. Power corporations turned off power
to the Greek Health Ministry when it failed to
pay its bill (Smith, Dec. 2011).
As an increasing number of Greeks refused
to pay the property taxes—and even their entire
electricity bills—the Public Power Corpora-
tion of Greece (PPC) faced a cash shortage. To
avoid a PPC bankruptcy and further burdens on
the economy, the Greek government had to
allow the PPC to retain €260 million of property
tax revenues until June 2012. The necessity of
this action introduces substantial uncertainty
about the tax from a practical view. Further-
more, the constitutionality of the property tax
is being challenged in Greek courts. In light
of these developments, the future of the new
Greek property tax is uncertain (Forelle).
Conclusion
The new Greece property tax is much
needed by a government struggling to find
sources of revenue in the face of a severe
sovereign debt crisis and widespread tax eva-
sion. The property tax is well defined and
utilizes a number of creative measures, includ-
ing tax enforcement by power companies
and a formula for assessment that is approx-
imately proportional to actual property values.
The tax is also in harmony with the philoso-
phies of economist Henry George, an advocate
of land taxation.
In light of the potential benefits of the
Greek property tax, it is unfortunate that this
effort to raise much-needed revenue has faced
so much public resistance. For Greece to move
out of its current fiscal crisis, those who oppose
the tax may have to reconsider and try to rec-
ognize its benefits. There is no way out of the
Greek debt crisis that does not involve
increased taxation. With the Greek economy in
so fragile a state, however, it is essential that
the government use taxation in ways that are
least likely to impede production and growth.
Of the readily available options, the property
tax may be the best option to this end. It justly
asks homeowners to pay more if they live in
larger houses and in better communities.
Unfortunately, in some measure, it is a tax
on production. However, it has the enormous
benefit over other taxes of being difficult to
evade, which means that it can provide the
Greek government with a relatively consistent
and reliable source of much-needed revenue.
Furthermore, the property tax will not con-
tribute to expansion of the black markets or to
the corruption that is so pervasive in Greece.
As long as the Greek public does not force a
repeal of the property tax, it may prevail as
an effective policy in the effort to solve the debt
crisis.
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